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"MEMBERS ONLY!" UNITED STATES v. RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE
BUILDING, ROOM 2113: THE SPEECH OR DEBATE
CLAUSE, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND
THE TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE OF
PREEMPTIVE NONDISCLOSURE
I. INTRODUCTION
Proponents of democracy have long recognized that, to most effec-
tively represent the will of the people, a legislature must be free to govern
without fear of retaliatory persecution at the hands of a separate and hos-
tile branch of government.' Indeed, the struggle to protect the legislature
from politically motivated judicial retribution began in England more
than five hundred years ago.2 In America, the Framers were so cognizant
1. See Leon R. Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional Speech-Its Origin, Mean-
ing and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 960, 961-62 (1950) ("Absolute freedom of speech
for members of legislative assemblies is one of the fundamentals of parliamentary
government, accepted as such by all governments which recognize the parliamen-
tary system and seek to ensure its independence."). Founding Father James Wil-
son said of the privilege:
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to dis-
charge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably neces-
sary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should
be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to
whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) (discussing Founding Fathers' rec-
ognition of need for legislative independence). In 1839, English Lord Denman
said:
The privilege of having [legislators'] debates unquestioned, though de-
nied when the members [of Parliament] began to speak their minds
freely in the time of Queen Elizabeth, and punished in its exercise both
by that princess and her two successors, was soon clearly perceived to be
indispensable and universally acknowledged.
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 202 (1880) (emphasis added) (discussing
history of privilege of legislative immunity).
The privilege of congressional immunity from suit based on legislative action
is recognized as a protection not only for legislators, but also for the people they
represent. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377 (discussing need for uninhibited legisla-
ture); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 503 (1969) (explaining that
immunity ensures that legislators are more freely able to represent will of constitu-
ents without fear of reprisal).
2. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, The Speech or Debate Clause: Bastion of Congressional
Independence or Haven for Corruption?, 57 N.C. L. REv. 197, 198 (1978) (referring to
legislative independence as result of "five hundred years of struggle between the
Crown and Parliaments in England"); see also Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372 (discussing
history of legislative independence and noting early parliamentary struggles for
independence during 1500-1600s); Alexander J. Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative
Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its Past, Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal
Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1968) (tracing roots of struggle
for legislative independence to fourteenth century British Parliament). For fur-
ther discussion of Parliament's struggles for independence from the Crown, and
(561)
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of the need for legislative rights that they unanimously resolved to include
certain legislative protections in the Constitution.3 Those protections ex-
ist in the form of a brief couplet known today as the Speech or Debate
Clause (the Clause), which states: "[F]or any Speech or Debate in either
House, [members of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other
place."
'4
The preservation of an effective and autonomous legislature is the
principal justification for legislative immunity. 5 This end is achieved by
employing legislative immunity as a guard against executive retribution for
performance of a legislature's representative duties.6 In the context of the
American system of checks and balances, the Speech or Debate Clause
primarily acts as a procedural safeguard of the separation of powers. 7
Over time, the Clause gradually expanded to completely immunize
members of Congress from suit based on actions within the scope of legis-
lative behavior considered a "speech or debate."8 The judicial expansion
the ways in which those struggles influenced the Framers of the American Consti-
tution, see infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
3. See United States v.Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177 (1966) (noting that Speech
or Debate Clause was ratified "without discussion and without opposition"); see also
Powell, 395 U.S. at 502 (describing ratification of Clause); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372
(stating that Founders recognized legislative privilege as "essential" component to
Constitution); Cella, supra note 2, at 14 (noting absence of opposition among
Framers with respect to Clause); RobertJ. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legis-
lative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1136 (1973) (rec-
ognizing lack of debate as to need for legislative immunity and hypothesizing that
agreement was due to "firm[ I] root[s]" of Clause). Though the Framers were
unanimous in their desire to include a passage conferring legislative privilege,
there was debate as to the inclusion of an affirmative recognition of the scope of
the Clause. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra, at 1136-38 (discussing Clause's enact-
ment at Constitutional Convention). For a discussion of the Framers' debate over
the limits of the Clause, see infra notes 32 and 35 and accompanying text.
4. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
5. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 182 (explaining that desire for legislative freedom is
"predominant thrust" of Speech or Debate Clause).
6. See Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congres-
sional Independence, 59 VA. L. REv. 175, 175 (1973) ("Since its framing, the Constitu-
tion has clothed [m]embers of Congress with the 'Speech or Debate' immunity so
that they might conduct the public's business with candor and independence.").
7. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 182 (referring to separation of powers as
"predominate thrust" of Speech or Debate Clause in American government). The
Supreme Court has spoken on the issue, stating that "[a]lthough the Speech or
Debate Clause's historic roots are in English history, it must be interpreted in light
of the American experience, and in the context of the American constitutional
scheme of government rather than the English parliamentary system." United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972) (discussing principal basis for legisla-
tive immunity in America). In Brewster, the Court went on to recognize that the
separation of powers in the American system addresses the differences between
Parliament's identity as the supreme governing body in England, and Congress's
stature as one of three separate but equal branches of American government. See
id. (contextualizing legislative immunity in England and America).
8. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 378 (providing immunity from civil suit arising out
of legislative act); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880) (same); see also
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of the Clause has been supported by an equally expansive justification of
the Clause not merely as a mechanism for the separation of powers, but as
a shield against interruption of the legislative process. 9 Thus, what was
substantively conceived as a protection from the judicial retribution of a
hostile Executive is today recognized as an absolute procedural roadblock
to otherwise legitimate judicial inquiry of any kind.10 At times, the judicial
expansion of the Clause has frustrated courts by providing minimal analy-
sis or justification for the expansion. 1 Today, circuit courts disagree
about the role of the Speech or Debate Clause as a testimonial privilege
against compelled disclosure of legislative materials.
1 2
This Note considers the current confusion regarding testimonial priv-
ilege of the Clause in the context of a heretofore-unprecedented action: a
Justice Department search of the congressional office of a sitting member
of the United States House of Representatives. 13 In particular, it considers
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in United States v. Rayburn
Brewster, 408 U.S. at 526 (qualifying portion of Johnson but affirming Clause as bar
to criminal prosecution for legislative acts); Johnson, 383 U.S. at 184-85 (recogniz-
ing Speech or Debate Clause as bar to criminal prosecution for legislative acts).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 369-71 (1980) (discussing
dual purposes of Clause). The Supreme Court has referred to the Speech or De-
bate Clause as possessing two interconnected but separate rationales: (1) to avoid
executive or judicial intrusion, and (2) to ensure wholesale legislative indepen-
dence. See id. (same). Compare Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180-81 (concluding that Clause
guards primarily against executive intimidation), with Eastland v. U.S. Service-
men's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503-04 (1975) (concluding that Clause exists principally
to protect against hostile Executive but also to ensure integrity of legislative
independence).
10. Cf Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) (concluding that
Clause prohibits questioning of Senator regarding Senator's use of confidential
Pentagon material); United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213, 225 (4th Cir. 1973)
(concluding that Clause bars inquiry into defendant legislator's conversations re-
garding actions of Subcommittee); Chapman v. Space Qualified Sys. Corp., 647 F.
Supp. 551, 554 (N.D. Fla. 1986) (holding that Clause prohibits inquiry into actions
of investigator working for House Subcommittee).
11. Cf Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 415
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (referring to Speech or Debate Clause as "deceptively simple").
In Brown & Williamson, the D.C. Circuit Court recognized the privilege as "some-
what complicated [and having] several strands." See id. (discussing Speech or De-
bate Clause).
12. Compare In re Grand Jury Investigation into Possible Violations of Title 18,
587 F.2d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 1978) (recognizing testimonial privilege of Speech or
Debate Clause as merely one of nonevidentiary use in regards to privileged docu-
ments), with Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 420 (recognizing testimonial privilege
of nondisclosure regardless of form of legislative material), MINPECO, S.A. v. Con-
ticommodity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 860-61 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same), and Miller
v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1983) (same). For further
discussion of the circuit split regarding the testimonial privilege accorded to legis-
lative documents, see infra notes 79-106 and accompanying text.
13. See A. David Pardo et al., Public Corruption, 44 AM. CRIm. L. REv. 855, 868-
69 (2007) (recognizing issue as judicially unresolved).
2008] NOTE 563
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House Office Building, Room 2113,14 the first appellate-level case to consider
the constitutionality of such a search. 15 The Rayburn court deftly applied
binding precedent to conclude that the Clause's testimonial privilege pro-
hibited incidental Justice Department review of Congressman William Jef-
ferson's privileged legislative documents.1 6 Nevertheless, the Rayburn
opinion failed to outline a clear method for balancing executive and legis-
lative interests under the Clause, and inadvertently demonstrated the
need for Supreme Court review of the testimonial privilege contained
therein.
17
Part II traces the parliamentary origins and American developments
of the Speech or Debate Clause before examining the current scope of the
Clause. 18 Part III recounts the specific facts that gave rise to the D.C. Cir-
cuit's decision in Rayburn.1 9 Part IV sets forth the circuit court's reasoning
in determining that a legislator's privilege under the Speech or Debate
Clause preemptively bars an uninvited review of legislative documents by
the Executive. 20 Part V analyzes both the Rayburn court's deft constitu-
tional application and the potentially hazardous shortcomings of the
court's conclusions. 2 1 Finally, Part VI discusses the potential impact of
14. 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3349 (U.S.
Dec. 19, 2007) (No. 07-816).
15. See id. at 659 (recognizing that no appellate court has yet addressed issue
of executive search of congressional office).
16. See id. at 656-63 (recognizing that testimonial privilege of Speech or De-
bate Clause barred compelled disclosure of legislative materials pursuant to valid
search warrant). The Rayburn court applied D.C. Circuit precedent recognizing
the testimonial privilege of the Speech or Debate Clause as one of absolute nondis-
closure. See id. (resolving controversy in accordance with circuit precedent). For a
discussion of the D.C. Circuit's consideration of testimonial immunity under the
Clause, see infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
17. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 662-63 (failing to consider possible remedies for
future executive violations of Speech or Debate Clause privileges with respect to
congressional offices). The Rayburn court referred to its own previously issued re-
mand order as evidence that the Clause could both protect a member of Con-
gress's legislative acts and recognize the Executive's interest in law enforcement.
See id. at 662 (attempting to reconcile competing legislative and executive inter-
ests). Nevertheless, the Rayburn court stopped short of advocating its own remand
processes to future courts, concluding that the Legislature and Executive could
best determine how to satisfy both interests. See id. at 663 ("How that accommoda-
tion [of legislative and executive interests] is to be achieved is best determined by
the legislative and executive branches .... ").
18. For a discussion of historical developments and the current state of the
Speech or Debate Clause, see infra notes 23-106 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the facts of Rayburn, see infra notes 108-20 and
accompanying text.
20. For a narrative discussion of the D.C. Circuit Court's reasoning in Ray-
burn, see infra notes 121-36 and accompanying text.
21. For a critical discussion of the D.C. Circuit Court's reasoning in Rayburn,
see infra notes 137-71 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 53: p. 561
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Rayburn on both the privilege of testimonial immunity and the relation-
ship between the three co-equal branches of government.
22
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Speech or Debate Clause
1. Historical Development of Legislative Privilege
Conceptually, legislative immunity originated during the centuries of
violent and convoluted discord between English Parliament and the Mon-
archy. 23 Over a period of centuries, Parliament moved beyond its initial
role as a judicial body and slowly took the form of a representative legisla-
ture.24 During this time, Parliament sought freedom from persecution for
22. For further discussion of the potential impact of the Rayburn decision on
both the separation of powers and the testimonial privilege of nondisclosure
under the Speech or Debate Clause, see infra notes 172-83 and accompanying text.
23. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 199-200 (tracing roots of Speech or Debate
Clause to Middle-Age England); The Bribed Congressman's Immunity From Prosecution,
75 YALE L.J. 335, 336 (1965) [hereinafter Bribed Congressman's Immunity] (discuss-
ing history of legislative privilege in context of "continuing constitutional struggle"
between Parliament and English Monarchy); see also United States v. Johnson, 383
U.S. 169, 177-78 (1966) (tracing American Speech or Debate Clause to English Bill
of Rights of 1689 and referring to that document as "culmination of a long strug-
gle for parliamentary supremacy"); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951)
("The privilege of legislators to be free from arrest or civil process for what they do
or say in legislative proceedings has taproots in the [p]arliamentary struggles of
the [s]ixteenth and [s]eventeenth [clenturies."); United States v. Rayburn House
Office Bldg., Room 2113, 497 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (recognizing Speech
or Debate Clause as descendant of privilege adopted by Parliament after centuries-
long conflict with Monarchy), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3349 (U.S. Dec. 19,
2007) (No. 07-816); Cella, supra note 2, at 3-12 (recognizing English roots of Amer-
ican Speech or Debate Clause and providing detailed discussion of evolution of
English privilege); Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 3, at 1120-35 (discussing ba-
sis for American Clause in English parliamentary history). For further discussion
of the historical battle for control of the English governmental system and its influ-
ence over the Speech or Debate Clause, see infra notes 24-29 and accompanying
text.
24. See Celia, supra note 2, at 4-6 (discussing maturation of Parliament from
judicial to legislative body); see also Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 3, at 1122-29
(discussing changing use and scope of privilege as Parliament matured). Parlia-
ment initially formed as a Norman assembly after the Norman Conquest of 1066.
See Celia, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing initial formulation of Parliament). Parlia-
ment was originally the highest judicial body in England, and not only promul-
gated laws, but also entered judgment on private issues. See Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 183 (1880) (discussing history of Parliament as judicial
body). Initially, Parliament's judgments were subject to the approval of the King.
See id. (explaining early functions of Parliament). After Parliament split into two
Houses, the House of Lords conducted review of the judgments of lower courts in
Westminster Hall. See id. at 184 (explaining divergent roles of Houses of
Parliament).
Parliament's original freedom of speech was a function of its judicial identity.
See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 3, at 1122-23 (explaining historical basis for
parliamentary immunity). Parliament's early immunities prohibited dissent or di-
vergent opinion from lower courts, but did not protect from the retribution of the
5
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legislative business. 25 Nevertheless, the Crown remained hostile to the
concept of shared governance and repeatedly subjected members of Par-
liament to civil and criminal actions arising out of legislative conduct.
26
Ultimately, Parliament prevailed over the Crown as the preeminent
governmental structure in England after the struggle for political co-exis-
tence led to a violent uprising in 1688.27 In the aftermath of the "Glorious
Revolution," Parliament enacted the English Bill of Rights of 1689.28 The
Crown. See id. at 1122 (describing scope of Parliament's immunity, as originally
exercised). Parliament's privileges evolved apace with Parliament itself. See, e.g.,
id. (discussing gradual evolution of legislative immunity in England).
25. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 3, at 1123 (discussing evolution of
Parliament). As early as the fourteenth century, Parliament began each session
with a "Speaker's Petition," which implored the King to forgo retribution for ac-
tions that provoked the Crown during the session. See Celia, supra note 2, at 5
(discussing Speaker's Petition); see also Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 3, at
1123 (concluding that Speaker's Petition represented loose definition of relation-
ship between Parliament and Monarchy). Parliament first included a formal re-
quest for freedom of speech in the Speaker's Petition of 1541. See Cella, supra note
2, at 6 (noting first inclusion of speech or debate privileges in Speaker's Petition).
26. See, e.g.,Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178 (discussing history of parliamentary op-
pression at hands of Tudor and Stuart monarchies). King Charles I used the
courts to imprison members of the House of Commons indefinitely on charges of
libel and sedition. See id. at 181 (detailing Parliament's persecution by King
Charles 1). Perhaps the most infamous early example that demonstrated the need
for parliamentary rights is that of Richard Strode in 1512. See Cella, supra note 2,
at 6 (discussing "Strode's Case"). Strode was a member of the House of Commons
who was imprisoned by a special miners court after imposing regulation of the tin
industry. See id. (recounting facts of Strode's Case); see alsoJosH CHAFETZ, DEMOC-
RACY'S PRIVILEGED FEW 70 (2007) (discussing Strode's Case and referring to con-
flict as "famous controversy"). Strode's ordeal prompted Parliament to create a
bill that annulled Strode's conviction and attempted to prevent similar attacks
upon legislators in the future. See Celia, supra note 2, at 6 (recalling conclusion to
Strode's Case).
In 1629, the Crown imprisoned three members of the House of Commons for
speech considered libelous. See CHAFETZ, supra, at 73 (recalling further harass-
ment of members of Parliament); Cella, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing persecution
of Elliot, Hollis and Valentine). John Elliot had spoken against what he believed
was an improper royal seizure of goods. See CHAFETZ, supra, at 73 (recalling facts
behind case against Elliot). Members Denzil Hollis and Benjamin Valentine had
physically restrained the Speaker during Elliot's speech. See id. (explaining basis
for charges against Hollis and Valentine); see also Johnson, 383 U.S. at 181 (refer-
ring to actions against Elliot, Hollis and Valentine as "notorious"). King Charles I
encouraged the convictions and though ultimately annulled by a later session of
Parliament, the charges profoundly impacted the members of the legislature. See
Johnson, 383 U.S. at 181-82 (discussing history of royal mistreatment of
Parliament).
27. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 (1969) (noting that ordeal
between Parliament and King "culminat[ed] in the Glorious Revolution of 1688
and the English Bill of Rights of 1689"); Ervin, supra note 6, at 179 (attributing
Revolution as response to imprisonment of members of Parliament); David Kaye,
Congressional Papers, Judicial Subpoenas, and the Constitution, 24 UCLA L. REv. 523,
547 (1976) (noting that English Revolution was prompted by questioning into leg-
islative process).
28. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372 (documenting enactment of English Bill of
Rights as follow-up to "Glorious Revolution" of 1688); Cella, supra note 2, at 12
[Vol. 53: p. 561
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ment from royal molestation for legislative acts.
2 9
2. American Adoption and Adaptation of the Speech or Debate Clause
The Speech or Debate Clause is recognizable as both a textual and
historical descendant of the British clause included in the Bill of Rights of
1689.-30 Though mindful of Parliament's long and troubling history of vic-
timization, the Framers recognized that legislative immunity had the po-
tential for abuse. 3 1 The Constitutional Convention was unanimous in its
support of a constitutional guarantee of legislative privilege, but the Fram-
ers debated the extent of the substantive protections to be afforded.
32
(discussing Revolution of 1688 and subsequent enactment of Bill of Rights of
1689). In 1688, King James II declared his intent to suspend all ecclesiastical
courts. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 3, at 1135 (discussing facts behind
Revolution of 1688). When seven bishops (among them the Archbishop of Can-
terbury) petitioned the King to reconsider, the King charged them with seditious
libel. See id. (same). The King's Bench was deadlocked over the King's power to
suspend laws, and a subsequent jury trial absolved the King. See id. (same). The
verdict spurned the "Glorious Revolution," after which Parliament exiled James
and abolished the King's suspending powers. See id. (discussing outcome of
Revolution of 1688).
29. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372 (recalling that English Bill of Rights of 1689
advanced legislative privilege in "unequivocal language"). The enactment of the
English Bill of Rights quelled the final serious threat to parliamentary indepen-
dence. See Celia, supra note 2, at 12 (recognizing that legislative freedom was
"never again seriously questioned or denied" after adoption of Bill of Rights (quot-
ing CARL WiTTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 30 (1921))).
30. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372-73 (recognizing that American Clause was
"quite close" to English clause); CHAFE-rz, supra note 26, at 87 (referring to Clause
as "adaptation - although not a straight importation . . . of the English Bill of
Rights"); Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 3, at 1120-21 (opining that Speech or
Debate Clause may be section of Constitution most recognizably descendant from
battle between King and Parliament). The Founders adopted the Speech or De-
bate Clause after removing the word "proceedings," so that protections were af-
forded to only speech or debate. See Laura Krugman Ray, Discipline Through
Delegation: Solving the Problem of Congressional Housecleaning, 55 U. Prir. L. Rrv. 389,
402-03 (1994) (contrasting American Clause with British counterpart). The ab-
sence of the word "proceedings" warrants a consideration of precisely what con-
duct constituted speech or debate and was thus subject to the privileges afforded
by the Clause. See id. at 403 (hypothesizing that American Clause might be read
more strictly in light of Founders' decision to truncate phrase).
31. See Ervin, supra note 6, at 179 (noting that Framers were vividly aware of
Parliament's struggles at hands of Monarchy); cf Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372 ("Free-
dom of speech and action in the legislature was taken as a matter of course by
those who severed the Colonies from the Crown and founded our Nation."). The
Framers were well-aware of Parliament's historical abuse of legislative privilege. See
Celia, supra note 2, at 15 (discussing Framers' awareness of Parliament's history of
abuse of legislative immunity). For a discussion of the American judicial recogni-
tion that the potential for abuse is outweighed by constitutional concerns for inde-
pendence, see infra note 40 and accompanying text.
32. See Celia, supra note 2, at 14-15 (discussing substance of debate over
boundaries of Speech or Debate Clause); see also Bradley, supra note 2, at 198-99
(same). According to one scholar, Framer [Charles] Pinckney sought to specify in
2008] NOTE
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American courts historically refer to the British legislative privilege when
seeking clarity on the scope and intent of the American version. 3 3 As with
its British ancestor, the primary function of the Speech or Debate Clause is
to guarantee the effectiveness and autonomy of the Legislature by protect-
ing that branch from judicial action initiated by the Executive and en-
forced by an oppressive Judiciary.
3 4
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause
For all their debate, the Framers consciously refrained from explicitly
limiting the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause.3 5 Thus, the Judiciary
the Constitution that members of each House were to act as judges of the extent of
the privilege. See Cella, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing Pinckney's view of bounds of
privilege). James Madison opposed the measure and advocated that the specific
scope of the privilege be expressly defined. See id. at 15 (recounting Madison's
desire that legislative privilege have express limits).
33. See, e.g., Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 9, 15-23, 3 Tyng 1, 9-17 (1808) (looking
to history of British privilege of immunity for legislative acts to determine purpose
and scope of American Clause); see also United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 369
(1980) (same); Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1975)
(same); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 622-24 (1972) (same); United States
v.Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181-83 (1966) (same); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372-75 (same);
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 201-05 (1880) (same); cf. United States v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1972) (contrasting roles of Parliament and Con-
gress to infer difference in role of American Clause). The Supreme Court has
distinguished the limited power of the federal government over the states from the
absolute power of Monarchy over Parliament, to infer that the Speech or Debate
Clause was not intended to provide immunity to state legislators in federal criminal
prosecutions. See Gillock, 445 U.S. at 370 (denying state legislator's claim of privi-
lege under Speech or Debate Clause).
One commentator lamented the modern Supreme Court decisions of Brewster
and Gravel as the products of "activist" judges, and differentiated those decisions
from earlier Supreme Court opinions that looked to the history of the Clause to
derive its meaning. See Ervin, supra note 6, at 180 (discussing Brewster and Gravel in
context of Court's traditional preference for examining history of legislative immu-
nity when defining scope of Speech or Debate Clause). For a discussion of the
Court's holdings in Brewster and Gravel, see infra notes 67-69 and accompanying
text, and notes 70-78 and accompanying text, respectively.
34. See, e.g., Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616 ("The Speech or Debate Clause was de-
signed to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech,
debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Executive
Branch.").
35. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 211-12 (discussing debate and final agreement
regarding explicit scope of legislative privilege). James Madison opposed a provi-
sion that would have allowed the legislature to self-determine the limits of the
Clause. See id. at 212 (discussing Madison's opposition). Madison believed that
such grants of power to the legislature would result in abuses similar to those of
Parliament in the years after the Bill of Rights of 1689. See id. (same). Ultimately,
Madison's view carried the majority. See id. (noting Madison's victory in debate
over limits to legislative privilege); see also U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (leaving
scope of protected behavior open for interpretation). One group of commenta-
tors hypothesized that the Framers abstained from explicit definition of the limits
of the privilege out of fear that a hostile Executive could easily manipulate explicit
limits. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 3, at 1140 (considering reason for
omission of limits to Speech or Debate Clause).
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bears the task of interpreting the Clause in a manner that comports with
the perceived intent of the Framers.3 6 In the context of the American
separation of powers, the Judiciary plays a unique role in application of
the Speech or Debate Clause-both as interpreters of the Constitution
and as guardians of legislative independence.
3 7
Judicial interpretation of the Clause traditionally focuses on two is-
sues: the behaviors encompassed by the term "speech or debate" and the
immunities provided by the bar against questioning in "any other place. 3
8
With minimal exception, courts view both issues through a broad lens.39
Despite the potential for abuse of the privilege, such breadth has long
been considered necessary to preserve congressional independence from
the specter of tyranny considered so repugnant by the Framers and their
parliamentary forbearers.
40
36. Cf Ray, supra note 30, at 403 (discussing Judiciary as determinant of scope
of protected behavior). One commentator has noted that the Framers' omission
of the word "proceedings" from the British version of the Clause is the basis for the
need to employ judicial review of the scope of protected behavior. See id. (hypoth-
esizing as to basis for judicial review of Clause).
The Supreme Court has more than once commented on the relative paucity
of judicial opinions interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause. See Kilbourn, 103
U.S. at 203 (referring to Massachusetts state court case in absence of federal ruling
on Speech or Debate Clause as of 1880); see also Johnson, 383 U.S. at 179 (attribut-
ing deficiency of opinions in part to self-evident nature of Clause).
37. See Ervin, supra note 6, at 181 (discussing role of Judiciary in interpreting
Speech or Debate Clause). The Supreme Court has long recognized the impor-
tance of both the constitutional role played by the Clause and the Court's own role
as "the guardian of a truly independent legislature." See id. (discussing role of
Clause and Court in constitutional framework).
38. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 3, at 1145-49 (discussing role of
Judiciary in interpreting Speech or Debate Clause).
39. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180 ("Kilbourn and Tenney indicate that the legisla-
tive privilege will be read broadly to effectuate its purposes."); Coffin v. Coffin, 4
Mass. 9, 30-31, 3 Tyng 1, 27 (1808) (advocating liberal reading of Clause); see also
Gravel, 408 U.S. at 618 (noting that "the Court has sought to implement its funda-
mental purpose of freeing the legislator from executive and judicial oversight that
realistically threatens to control [one's] conduct as a legislator"); Bradley, supra
note 2, at 213 (recognizing American inclination towards broad reading and hy-
pothesizing that scope of judicial review of Clause will not change).
40. Cf United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972) (justifying expan-
sive privilege under Clause as intention of Framers). The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that broad interpretation of the Clause necessarily provides immunity to
reproachable behavior by members of Congress. See id. (recognizing that Clause
has "enabled reckless men to slander and even destroy others with impunity"); see
also Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180 (precluding investigation into allegations of congres-
sional behavior that Court recognized as "reprehensible"); Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) ("The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the
privilege."). Commentators speculate as to the propriety of such a broad interpre-
tation. Cf Bradley, supra note 2, at 213 (arguing that Framers preferred narrow
interpretation and lamenting modern judicially-interpreted scope of Clause). Fur-
ther, one scholar has criticized the Court's preference for broad interpretation as
lacking historical basis. See id. at 215-16 (critiquing Court's interpretation of
Speech or Debate Clause). Nevertheless, the Court steadfastly adheres to a broad
interpretation of the Clause, and has resigned itself to the lesser evil of intermit-
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1. Speech or Debate: Scope of Protected Behavior
The words "speech or debate" protect more legislative conduct than
the text of the term implies. 4' The Supreme Court demonstrated its pref-
erence for broad interpretation of the phrase in Kilbourn v. Thompson,42 a
case of first impression. 43 In Kilbourn, the Court relied on the British his-
tory of legislative privilege and the early Massachusetts case Coffin v. Cof-
fin,44 and concluded that the privilege applied to "things generally done
in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business
before it."45 Today, the Speech or Debate Clause protects activities
"clearly a part of the legislative process-the due functioning of the pro-
cess." 46 This protection extends to "motivations" for privileged legislative
tent protection for corrupt legislative acts. See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's
Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 510-11 (1975) (recognizing that Clause must protect even un-
savory legislative behavior and that broad reading was conscious choice of
Framers).
41. See, e.g., Gravel, 408 U.S. at 617 (concluding that limiting protection to
only speech or debate was "unacceptably narrow view").
42. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
43. See id. at 204 (concluding that no federal court had yet interpreted
Speech or Debate Clause).
44. 4 Mass. 9, 3 Tyng 1 (1808).
45. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204. The Court further condemned a literal inter-
pretation of the Clause as "narrow." See id. (justifying preference for broad inter-
pretation of Speech or Debate Clause). The Kilbourn court looked to the British
case Stockdale v. Hansard, in which Lord Drennan explained:
The privilege of having [Parliament's] debates unquestioned, though de-
nied when the members began to speak their minds freely in the time of
Queen Elizabeth, and punished in its exercise both by that princess and
her two successors, was soon clearly perceived to be indispensable and
universally acknowledged. By consequence, whatever is done within the
walls of either assembly must pass without question in any other place.
See id. at 202 (emphasis added) (quoting Stockdale in attempt to glean historical
scope of privileged legislative behavior). The Court concluded that the similar
wording chosen by the Framers led to a reasonable inference that the Founders
"meant the same thing." See id. (explaining policy reasons behind broad interpre-
tation of Clause).
The Kilbourn Court relied heavily on Coffin in the absence of a relevant federal
court opinion. See id. at 202-04 (conducting exhaustive analysis of Coffin). In Cof-
fin, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the text of the
speech or debate clause of the Massachusetts constitution was to be read "liber-
ally," and that the protection extended to "every[ ] act resulting from the nature
[of the member's office], and [done] in the execution of [it]." See Coffin, 4 Mass.
at 30-31, 3 Tyng at 27 (discussing breadth of interpretation of legislative privilege).
The Kilbourn Court justified its reliance upon the state court decision in Coffin by
stating that the temporal proximity of the Coffin decision to the framing of the
Constitution accorded much weight to the decision. See Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204
(justifying reliance on Coffin). For further discussion of the facts of Kilbourn and
Coffin and analysis of both decisions in the context of a grant of civil immunity
under the Clause, see infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
46. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 515-16 (1972) (setting forth
definitional framework of protected legislative activities).
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conduct. 47 The Court has distinguished the legislative process from other-
wise legitimate activities deemed "political" in nature and thus outside the
scope of the protections of the Clause.48 Using that yardstick, the Clause
has been interpreted to protect actions taken in congressional commit-
tees, as well as speeches made in Congress and actions taken in the course
of congressional investigations.
49
The Clause provides absolute protection for legislative acts and is not
balanced against competing interests when applied.50 Further, the Clause
protects even potentially illegal legislative actions that might otherwise
serve as a basis for liability. 51 The modern Supreme Court construes the
47. See United States v.Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 184-85 (1966) (concluding that
bribery investigation of former representative was barred by Speech or Debate
Clause). In Johnson, the Court concluded that the Speech or Debate Clause pre-
cluded a criminal investigation into allegations that a former representative had
taken money in exchange for making a speech on the House floor. See id. (discuss-
ing facts of Johnson and Court's holding). The investigation sought to determine
whether the representative had made the speech in exchange for, the money. See
id. (same). According to the Court, inquiries into improper motivation were ex-
plicitly precluded by the Clause. See id. (discussing Court's treatment of conspiracy
charge in Johnson).
48. See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512-13 (discussing distinction between legislative
and political acts); see also 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.8(b) (4th ed. 2007) (discussing legislative-political
distinction).
49. See Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204-05 (recognizing Clause as providing civil im-
munity for contempt vote); see also United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 487
(1979) (holding that Clause prohibits inquiry into any evidence surrounding legis-
lative acts); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S 306, 317-18 (1973) (providing civil immunity
for House Committee's decision to include names and descriptions of poorly be-
haved children in report on D.C. schools); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606,
626 (1972) (granting legislative immunity for preparation for and actions taken
during Senate Committee meeting, but withholding immunity for attempts to re-
publish material with national publishing house); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387
U.S. 82, 84-85 (1967) (recognizing Clause as bar on subpoena seeking information
on Senate Committee plans for raid on citizen); Johnson, 383 U.S. at 177 (ex-
tending privilege to criminal immunity for speech made on House floor); Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1951) (extending civil immunity for actions of
state legislative committee).
50. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975)
("[0] nce it is determined that Members are acting within the 'legitimate legisla-
tive sphere' the Speech or Debate Clause is an absolute bar to interference."); see
also United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113, 497 F.3d 654, 661-62
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (refusing to balance privilege with governmental interest in con-
ducting investigation), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3349 (U.S. Dec. 19, 2007)
(No. 07-816).
51. See Doe, 412 U.S. at 312-13 (recognizing protection for legislative acts even
where behavior outside of legislative context would constitute violation of civil or
criminal statutes); see also Eastland, 421 U.S. at 507 (recognizing Speech or Debate
Clause as protection against challenge that subpoena issued by Senate Subcommit-
tee was designed only to harass respondent); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377 ("The claim of
an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege.").
11
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bounds of the privilege within the general framework first established in
Kilbourn.52
2. Any Other Place: Privileges Accorded to Legislative Acts
Both in England and America, the phrase "shall not be questioned in
any other place" bars the prosecution of legislators for actions that are a
part of the legislative process. 53 Conceptually, the Clause exists to shield
members of Congress from intimidation by the Executive. 5 4 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has drawn upon both the American preference for
broad interpretation and the British history of legislative privilege to con-
clude that the bar on questioning "in any other place" immunizes legisla-
tors from criminal and civil liability for legislative acts.55
The Massachusetts case Coffin v. Coffin, the earliest recorded judicial
review of legislative immunity, recognized the Clause as a bar on private
civil suits regarding legislative actions. 56 Coffin concerned the application
52. See, e.g., Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 488 ("A legislative act has consistently been
defined as an act generally done in Congress in relation to the business before
it."). The Court has narrowed the scope of the privilege for peripheral issues such
as the re-publication of legislative documents or actions, but has remained true to
its general expansive view. Compare Gravel, 408 U.S. at 622 (concluding that re-
publication of Pentagon Papers was not legislative activity), with Helstoski, 442 U.S.
at 488-89 (finding that Speech or Debate Clause forbids judicial investigation into
"how [a legislator] acted, voted or decided").
53. See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 502 (noting that legislative immunity "insure[s]
that the legislative function the Constitution allocates to Congress may be per-
formed independently").
54. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 181 (concluding that Clause was developed "to
prevent intimidation by the [E]xecutive and accountability before a possibly hos-
tile J]udiciary").
55. See Yankwich, supra note 1, at 966 (recognizing expansion of legislative
privilege beyond its initial purpose); see also Johnson, 383 U.S. at 184-85 (barring
criminal prosecution of Senator for bribery where investigation would require de-
termination of Senator's motives for making speech in Congress); Tenney, 341 U.S.
at 369 (providing civil immunity to California state senators accused of harassment
in bringing plaintiff before legislative committee); Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204-05
(providing civil immunity to House members who allegedly committed witness to
jail for contempt).
The Clause does not immunize members of Congress for acts that fall outside
the ambit of "speech or debate." See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wil-
liams, 62 F.3d 408, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("The Clause is not, to be sure, a blanket
prohibition on suits against congressmen. It protects only those congressional acts
properly . . . within the legislative function"); see also Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d
865, 880 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that privilege does not extend to legislator's
decisions to fire staff members), rev'd en banc on other grounds, 571 F.2d 793 (5th
Cir. 1978), revd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). For a discussion of the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of legislative activities protected by the Speech or
Debate Clause, see supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
56. See Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 9, 21-22, 3 Tyng 1, 15-16 (1808) (recognizing
Massachusetts speech or debate clause as bar on private civil suits). Coffin is widely
recognized as the foundation for subsequent judicial interpretation of the scope
and application of the Speech or Debate Clause. See Cella, supra note 2, at 18
(recognizing Coffin as "classic American formulation of the scope and extent of the
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of the Massachusetts speech or debate clause in a slander lawsuit against a
Massachusetts legislator.5 7 After considering the English history of the
Clause, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that legisla-
tive privilege existed to protect legislators from fear of liability of any
kind.5
8
The Supreme Court affirmed that the Clause bars private civil suits in
Kilbourn v. Thompson.59 Kilbourn was a suit for false imprisonment brought
by a private citizen who sought damages from members of Congress and
congressional personnel after Congress imprisoned the plaintiff for forty-
five days. 6 0 The Court relied heavily on the Coffin analysis and concluded
that the Speech or Debate Clause barred private civil suits against
legislators.
61
In 1966 the Supreme Court, in United States v. Johnson,62 formally rec-
ognized that the Speech or Debate Clause barred criminal prosecution for
legislative acts. 63 The defendant in Johnson was a former legislator accused
of accepting money in exchange for delivering a speech on the floor of
the House. 64 The Johnson Court invoked the British history of the Clause
and recalled that English monarchs had intimidated members of Parlia-
privilege"); see also X. L. Suarez, Congressional Immunity: A Criticism of Existing Dis-
tinctions and a Proposal for a New Definitional Approach, 20 VILL. L. Rrv. 97, 97 (1975)
(referring to Coffin as "early and authoritative").
57. See Coffin, 4 Mass. at 10, 3 Tyng at 1-2 (discussing factual basis for suit).
The speech or debate clause of the Massachusetts constitution granted "[t]he free-
dom of deliberation, speech, and debate, in either house of the legislature." See id.
at 14, 3 Tyng at 7 (quoting Massachusetts speech or debate clause).
58. See id. at 24-25, 3 Tyng at 19 (justifying clause as bar on private civil suit).
59. 103 U.S. 168, 203-05 (1880) (holding that Clause precludes private civil
suits against legislators).
60. See id. at 193-98 (discussing factual basis for suit). Kilbourn involved a
bankrupt firm indebted to the government. See Suarez, supra note 56, at 101 (ex-
plaining facts of Kilbourn). The plaintiff in Kilbourn refused to comply with a con-
gressional subpoena that compelled testimony regarding the firm. See id. (same).
The plaintiff was jailed for contempt of Congress. See Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 193
(explaining charges against plaintiff.)
61. See id. at 203-05 (adopting Coffin rationale for application of Speech or
Debate Clause to private civil suit).
62. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
63. See id. at 180 (reviewing English and American precedent and noting ab-
sence of case law addressing application of Speech or Debate Clause to criminal
proceeding); see also Bribed Congressman's Immunity, supra note 23, at 344 (noting
that Clause had not been recognized as bar to criminal prosecution prior to
Johnson).
64. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 170-72 (discussing factual basis for trial). The de-
fendant in Johnson was a former legislator accused of seven counts of violating the
federal conflict of interest statute, and one count of conspiracy to defraud the
United States. See id. (same). The prosecution alleged that Congressman Johnson
and another legislator, in exchange for substantial payments, agreed to pressure
the Justice Department to dismiss fraud charges against a Maryland savings and
loan bank. See id. at 171-72 (describing alleged illegal scheme). Part of the charge
stated that Congressman Johnson had received monies dubbed "campaign contri-
butions" in exchange for his actions, which included delivering a speech favorable
5732008] NOTE
13
Friel: Members Only - United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, Ro
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
VILI.ANOVA LAW REVIEW
ment with the threat of both civil and criminal suit.65 Accordingly, the
Court held that the Speech or Debate Clause barred any criminal prosecu-
tion for legislative acts. 66 Shortly thereafter, the Court qualified Johnson's
broad holding in United States v. Brewster.6 7 In Brewster, the Court rejected
the Johnson Court's estimation of bribery as a legislative act.68 Neverthe-
less, Brewster effectively reaffirmed the Johnson Court's bar on criminal
prosecutions for legislative acts.
69
C. Testimonial Immunity
1. The Supreme Court Recognizes Testimonial Immunity: Gravel v. United
States
In 1972, the Supreme Court recognized that the Speech or Debate
Clause includes a testimonial privilege against compelled disclosure of leg-
islative materials. 70 In that decision, Gravel v. United States,7 1 the Court
considered whether the protections of the Speech or Debate Clause ex-
tended to actions taken by a legislator's staff.72 The question came before
the Court as a challenge to a federal grand jury subpoena that sought the
testimony of an aide to United States Senator Mike Gravel. 7
3
to independent savings and loan associations on the House floor. See id. at 171-76
(same).
65. See id. at 179-84 (discussing Speech or Debate Clause in context of English
history of legislative privilege).
66. See id. at 184-85 ("We hold that a prosecution under a general criminal
statute dependant on such inquiries [into motivation for legislative acts] necessa-
rily contravenes the Speech or Debate Clause.").
67. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
68. See id. at 514-16 (qualifying Johnson's bar on criminal prosecution for legis-
lative acts). The Brewster Court concluded that congressional misconduct was not
protected unless it was part of the "due functioning of the [legislative] process."
See id. at 516 (same). Specifically, the Court in Brewster permitted the prosecution
of a former legislator under a bribery statute, concluding that acceptance of a
bribe was not related to the legislative process and thus not privileged. See id. at
526 (same). Thus, the government was permitted to investigate whether, at the
time the legislator accepted money from a conspirator, the legislator was aware
that the money was given in exchange for performance of a legislative duty. See id.
(explaining reasoning in Brewster).
69. Cf id. at 515-16 (recognizing that Speech or Debate Clause prevented
criminal prosecution for legislative acts but qualifying wholesale ban on such crim-
inal prosecutions set forth in Johnson).
70. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) (recognizing tacitly
that Senator Mike Gravel could not be made to answer questions regarding legisla-
tive process).
71. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
72. See id. at 613 (recognizing principal inquiry as whether Speech or Debate
Clause applied to actions of legislative aide to United States Senator).
73. See id. at 607 (discussing factual background to suit). A federal grand jury
issued a subpoena to compel the testimony of a congressional aide to Senator Mike
Gravel regarding reports that the Senator had attempted to publish classified De-
fense Department documents known as the "Pentagon Papers." See id. at 608 (ex-
plaining factual basis for action). Senator Gravel intervened to quash the
[Vol. 53: p. 561
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss3/4
Before addressing the constitutional issue in controversy, the Court
considered whether the activities that were the subject of the subpoena
would be privileged with respect to the Senator.7 4 With regards to Senator
Gravel, the Court concluded: "[w]e have no doubt that Senator Gravel
may not be made to answer-either in terms of questions or in terms of de-
fending himself from prosecution-for the events that occurred at the
subcommittee meeting."75 This statement was the Court's first implicit
recognition of a testimonial immunity provided by the Speech or Debate
Clause. 76 A voluminous body of case law has relied upon this dictum as
the basis for a testimonial privilege under the Clause.7 7 Nevertheless, the
subpoena, arguing that such compelled disclosure violated the Speech or Debate
Clause. See id. at 608-09 (explaining procedural posture of issue presented).
74. See id. at 613 (considering first whether behavior that was subject of sub-
poena inquiry was in fact privileged behavior with respect to Senator). The scope
of the subpoena focused on the Senator's procurement and subsequent reading of
the Pentagon Papers to a convened session of the Subcommittee on Buildings and
Grounds, of which Senator Gravel was chairman. See id. at 608-09 (recounting in-
formation sought by subpoena of Senator Gravel's aide); see also Suarez, supra note
56, at 117 (noting that Government convened grand jury to determine from whom
Senator Gravel procured Pentagon Papers). The press subsequently reported that
Senator Gravel and his aides had discussed the possibility of publishing the docu-
ments in book format. See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 609-10 (noting that members of
Gravel's staff were reported to have spoken with national publishers). The sub-
poena sought to compel testimony of Senator Gravel's aide with respect to those
discussions, pursuant to possible criminal charges relating to the gathering, con-
cealing, converting and transmission of public records. See id. at 608-10 (acknowl-
edging purpose and scope of investigation).
75. See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616 (emphasis added) (concluding that Senator
Gravel could not be compelled to answer questions nor to defend suit regarding
legislative acts).
76. See id. (recognizing testimonial immunity); see also United States v. Ray-
burn House Office Bldg., Room 2113, 497 F.3d 654, 659-60 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing
Gravel as precedential authority recognizing testimonial immunity), petition for cert.
filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3349 (U.S. Dec. 19, 2007) (No. 07-816); In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation into Possible Violations of Title 18, 587 F.2d 589, 596-97 (3d Cir. 1978)
(citing Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616) (recognizing testimonial immunity).
77. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29-30 (1980) (recognizing that members
of Congress are not required to answer questions about legislative actions); Fields
v. Office of Eddie Bernice Johnson, 459 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (recognizing
legislative immunity set forth in Gravel); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same); MINPECO, S.A. v. Conticom-
modity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 861-62 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same); Schlitz v. Vir-
ginia, 854 F.2d 43, 45-46 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616)
(recognizing that purpose of Clause is to prevent legislators from forced testimony
regarding legislative acts), overruled on other grounds by Berkley v. City of Charleston,
63 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 1995); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 529
(9th Cir. 1983) (recognizing legislative immunity set forth in Gravel); In re Grand
Jury Investigation into Possible Violation of Title 18, 587 F.2d 589, 594-95 (3d Cir.
1978) (same); United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 1976) (same);
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. 11, 18 (D.D.C. 1981) (citing Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616)
("It is beyond dispute that the [Sipeech or [D]ebate [C]lause confers ... immu-
nity from judicial process requiring [legislators] to answer questions relating to the
performance of their legislative duties.").
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Court has not addressed the precise nature and scope of the Speech or
Debate Clause's testimonial privilege.
78
2. Circuit Split Regarding Privilege of Testimonial Immunity
In the absence of a controlling decision, the Third Circuit has split
with the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit regarding the nature of the
testimonial privilege of the Speech or Debate Clause. 79 The Third Circuit
emphasizes the form and purpose of the desired testimony and, in certain
instances, recognizes the testimonial privilege as one of mere noneviden-
tiary use.8 0 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit effectively
recognize that the testimonial privilege bars all forms of questioning re-
garding privileged legislative acts.81
a. The Third Circuit's Nonevidentiary Use Doctrine
The Third Circuit, in In re Grand Jury Investigation into Possible Viola-
tions of Title 18,8 2 concluded that the testimonial privilege of the Speech or
Debate Clause did not bar the subpoena and review of congressional of-
fice phone records as part of a grand jury investigation.8 3 The Grand Jury
78. Cf Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616 (recognizing testimonial immunity but failing
to expound upon nature of privilege).
79. Compare MINPECO, 844 F.2d at 862 (recognizing testimonial privilege as
one of nondisclosure and holding that discovery by subpoena of congressional
committee documents for testimonial use violated Speech or Debate Clause),
Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 417 (holding that testimonial nondisclosure privi-
lege under Clause precluded subpoena of Subcommittee members to determine
how they obtained stolen documents), and Miller, 709 F.2d at 529 (barring deposi-
tion of former legislator regarding document introduced into Congressional Record),
with In re Grand Jury Investigation into Possible Violation of Title 18, 587 F.2d at
597 (referring to Speech or Debate Clause privilege in certain circumstances as
"one of nonevidentiary use, not of non-disclosure").
80. See In re Grand Jury Investigation into Possible Violation of Title 18, 587
F.2d at 597 (recognizing testimonial privilege as nonevidentiary use in context of
documents and third-party proceedings). For further discussion of the Third Cir-
cuit's treatment of the testimonial privilege touched upon in Gravel, see infra notes
82-89 and accompanying text.
81. See Miller, 709 F.2d at 528-30 (recognizing testimonial nondisclosure privi-
lege of Speech or Debate Clause when applied to privileged documents or third-
party testimony); see also MINPECO, 844 F.2d at 856 (same); Brown & Williamson, 62
F.3d at 408 (same).
82. 587 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1978).
83. See id. at 598 (affirming district court's decision not to quash subpoena).
The subpoena duces tecum was filed by a United States Attorney in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania and was served upon the Clerk of the House of Represent-
atives. See id. at 591 (recounting issuance and nature of subpoena). The subpoena
sought to compel the Clerk to appear before a grand jury and produce phone
records for the office of Congressman Joshua Eilberg. See id. at 591-92 (same).
The subpoena sought the records for phone calls made from the legislator's office
from 1973 through March 2, 1978. See id. at 591 (same). The subpoena was part
of a grand jury investigation into possible criminal conduct relating to the financ-
ing and building of a Philadelphia hospital. See id. at 592 (same). Congressman
Eilberg intervened to challenge the subpoena on three grounds, including that
[Vol. 53: p. 561
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss3/4
20081 NOTE
court recognized that the phone records were at least in part evidence of
legislative acts and thus potentially privileged under the Clause.8 4 Never-
theless, the Grand Jury court permitted the United States Attorney to par-
ticipate in judicial review conducted to separate and exclude privileged
phone calls.
85
The Third Circuit differentiated between Gravels testimonial immu-
nity against questioning, and a "use immunity" that barred the introduc-
tion of legislative acts into evidence against a legislator.8 6 The court
further distinguished legislative immunity from privileges such as the at-
torney-client privilege, which the court concluded was designed to foster a
"socially desirable confidential relationship [ ] [with another party].*"87 Ac-
cording to the Grand Jury court, the testimonial and use privileges under
the Speech or Debate Clause existed to protect legislators from "hostile
questioning" and were not implicated in the review of potentially privi-
leged documents.8 8 Citing non-binding circuit precedent, the court con-
cluded that "the privilege when applied to records . . . is one of
nonevidentiary use, not of nondisclosure."
8 9
b. The Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Doctrine of Nondisclosure
The Ninth Circuit, in Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc.,90 recognized
the testimonial privilege in a broader framework of wholesale nondisclo-
sure. 9 1 In Miller, the court concluded that the Speech or Debate Clause
forbade the subpoena in a civil suit of a non-party former legislator regard-
the Speech or Debate Clause prohibited grand jury review of the phone records.
See id. (discussing Congressman Eilberg's challenge of subpoena).
84. See id. at 595-96 (recognizing evidentiary value of phone records but con-
cluding that phone calls related to legislation could not be used to incriminate
legislator).
85. See id. at 597 ("[E]xamination [of the phone records] by the executive
branch prior to submission to the Court does not violate the Congressman's use
immunity."). The Grand Jury court concluded that on remand, the legislator
should be permitted to submit affidavits identifying those phone calls that he con-
tends are privileged. See id. (setting forth procedure for review of phone records).
The United States Attorney was permitted to contest the legislator's assertion of
privilege. See id. (same).
86. See id. at 596 (differentiating between testimonial immunity and use im-
munity). The Grand Juiy court observed that use immunity formed the basis for all
Speech or Debate Clause privileges. See id. (analyzing use immunity in context of
broader Speech or Debate Clause discussion).
87. See id. (discussing use immunity and contrasting legislative privilege with
attorney-client, doctor-patient and priest-churchgoer privileges).
88. See id. at 596-97 (interpreting justification for testimonial immunity). The
court concluded that the Constitution had a "limited toleration for secrecy" sur-
rounding the legislative process. See id. (same).
89. See id. at 597 (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Cianfrani), 563 F.2d
577, 584 (3d Cir. 1977)) (refusing to apply Federal Speech or Debate Clause privi-
lege to state legislator for federal prosecution).
90. 709 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1983).
91. See id. at 527-29 (quashing subpoena of former legislator as contrary to
Speech or Debate Clause).
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ing the legislator's inclusion of materials in the Congressional Record. 92
Employing the justification that the Clause historically assured congres-
sional freedom of speech, the Miller court refused to distinguish applica-
tion of the Clause based on the legislator's retiree status.9 3 Rather, the
court held that any inquiry into even past legislative affairs would have a




Ten years later, in MINPECO, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc.,9 5 the
D.C. Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, holding that a sub-
poena in a civil suit seeking information from a non-party House Subcom-
mittee regarding a committee report violated the Speech or Debate
Clause.9 6 The MINPECO court drew heavily from the Supreme Court's
holding in Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund,97 which emphasized that a
principal function of the Clause was to protect legislators from the distrac-
tion of legal proceedings. 98 Applying that principle, the MINPECO court
concluded that discovery proceedings could intrude upon the legislative
process just as egregiously as an actual suit.99
92. See id. (concluding that Speech and Debate privilege applied to former
member of Congress). The plaintiff in Miller was a union pension fund trustee
who filed suit against the defendant press company for libel, arising out of a June
1972 article in Overdrive Magazine that accused the plaintiff of misappropriating
union pension funds. See id. at 526 (recounting factual background and events
leading up to lawsuit). Not long after the article was published, Congressman Stei-
ger inserted the article into the Congressional Record. See id. (same). The plaintiff
obtained a subpoena duces tecum to question Congressman Steiger, but the legis-
lator responded by invoking the privileges of the Speech or Debate Clause. See id.
(discussing Congressman Steiger's assertion of protection under Speech or Debate
Clause).
93. See id. (applying Speech or Debate Clause privilege to retired member of
Congress).
94. See id. at 528-29 (providingjustification for bar on disclosure of privileged
legislative materials).
95. 844 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
96. See id. at 859-60 (affirming district court's decision to quash subpoena as
violation of Speech or Debate Clause). MINPECO was a civil suit in which the
defendants believed that the plaintiffs planned to introduce at trial a sworn state-
ment published by the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Mone-
tary Affairs. See id. at 857 (discussing factual basis for suit). The defendants
asserted that they possessed a congressional stenographer's manuscript of the
statement in conflict with the statement entered into publication. See id. (same).
The defendants sought to compel the subpoena duces tecum of the Congressional
Custodian of Records and the Staff Director of the House Subcommittee. See id. at
858 (discussing tools of discovery utilized by defendants). The Subcommittee
sought to quash the subpoenas under the Speech or Debate Clause. See id. (dis-
cussing Subcommittee's response to subpoena).
97. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
98. See MINPECO, 844 F.2d at 859 (quoting Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503) (discuss-
ing Speech or Debate Clause as protection against interruption of legislative
process).
99. See id. (justifying bar on discovery proceedings regarding privileged legis-
lative documents).
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The D.C. Circuit expanded upon this principle in Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Williams.'0 0 Brown & Williamson involved a plaintiff's sub-
poena duces tecum of two sitting members of Congress that was issued to
review purportedly stolen documents in the possession of the Subcommit-
tee on which the representatives sat. 10 ' The Brown & Williamson court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the subpoenas were distinguishable
from those in Miller and MINPECO because the subpoenas did not impli-
cate the representatives in misconduct) 0 2 The D.C. Circuit in Brown &
Williamson again relied upon the role of the Speech or Debate Clause as a
protection of the uninterrupted functioning of Congress.
10 3
The Brown & Williamson court categorically rejected the Third Cir-
cuit's dissection of the Clause as a testimonial privilege against compelled
questioning and a use privilege as applied to documentary evidence. 10 4
According to the D.C. Circuit, "indications as to what Congress is looking
at provide clues as to what Congress is doing."10 5 Thus, the Brown & Wil-
liamson court affirmed the D.C. Circuit precedent set forth in MINPECO,
recognizing no distinction between oral and documentary evidence and
100. 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
101. See id. at 411-12 (discussing factual background of action). The plaintiff
in Brown & Williamson was a tobacco company involved in a civil suit against a
former employee for breach of contract and a variety of tort claims. See id. at 411
(same). The employee allegedly copied sensitive tobacco company documents
and had been planning to use the documents in a civil suit against a former em-
ployer. See id. (same). The employee returned the documents allegedly copied.
See id. (same).
Nevertheless, Congressman Waxman, Chairman of the House Subcommittee
on Health and the Environment, subsequently disclosed that, as part of a Subcom-
mittee investigation into the tobacco industry, the Subcommittee had reviewed
documents related to a 1960s tobacco company study regarding manipulated nico-
tine levels in cigarettes. See id. at 412 (discussing Congressman Waxman's involve-
ment in case). Congressman Waxman stated that the documents "'were evidently
stolen from some law firm .... .' See id. (quoting Congressman Waxman regard-
ing origin of documents sought in subpoena). The tobacco company issued the
subpoenas duces tecum to review the documents discussed by Waxman in order to
determine if they belonged to the company. See id. (explaining purpose of
subpoenas).
102. See id. at 418-19 (refusing to differentiate attempts to compel disclosure
on basis of potential implications of misconduct to be gleaned from discovery).
The tobacco company had argued that the recognized goal of preserving the integ-
rity of the legislative process was not effected by the subpoenas because the integ-
rity of the representatives was not in question. See id. at 418 (discussing tobacco
company's argument for non-application of Speech or Debate Clause).
103. See id. at 419 ("The [Speech or Debate Clause] privilege is not designed
to protect the reputations of congressmen but rather the functioning of
Congress.").
104. See id. at 418 ("Discovery procedures can prove just as intrusive [as litiga-
tion]." (quoting MJNPECO, 844 F.2d at 859)).
105. See id. at 420 (rationalizing nondisclosure of privileged legislative
documents).
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providing an absolute bar on both when applied to legislative acts. 10 6 It
was amidst this body of conflicted interpretation that the D.C. Circuit
Court considered the constitutionality of an executive-initiated search of a
sitting legislator's office in United States v. Rayburn House Office Building,
Room 2113.107
III. FACTS: UNITED STATES V. RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING,
ROOM 2113
In May 2006, the Department ofJustice obtained and executed a war-
rant to search the congressional office of Representative William J. Jeffer-
son.' 0 8 The search was part of an ongoing investigation of Congressman
Jefferson regarding a variety of criminal charges related to bribery and
fraud. 10 9 To respect Congressman Jefferson's legislative immunity, the
warrant application specified distinct procedures for unaffiliated Justice
Department and FBI agents to follow while reviewing all seized documents
106. See id. at 421-22 (recognizing that D.C. Circuit precedent precluded dis-
tinguishing between oral and documentary testimony and applying principle of
absolute nondisclosure to both).
107. See 497 F.3d 654, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (addressing issue of whether
search procedures violated Speech or Debate Clause), petition for cert. filed, 76
U.S.L.W. 3349 (U.S. Dec. 19, 2007) (No. 07-816).
108. See id. at 656-57 (describing application for and execution of warrant to
search Congressman Jefferson's office). The Justice Department applied for the
warrant on May 18, 2006. See id. at 656 (noting date of warrant application). The
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia approved the warrant that day,
and ordered that the warrant be executed on or before May 21, 2006. See id. at 657
(discussing district court's approval of search warrant). The Justice Department
search began on Saturday night, May 20, 2006, and lasted approximately eighteen
hours. See id. (discussing date and duration of Justice Department search of Con-
gressman Jefferson's congressional office).
109. See id. at 656 (detailing investigation of Congressman Jefferson). The
Justice Department was investigating allegations that Congressman Jefferson ac-
cepted bribes in exchange for fostering the sale of communications technology
and services produced by a Louisville company named iGate to several African
nations, including Nigeria and Ghana. See id. (explaining that Congressman Jeffer-
son was investigated for "bribery of a public official, wire fraud, bribery of a foreign
official, and conspiracy to commit these crimes"); Corrected Brief of Appellee at 4-
6, Rayburn, 497 F.3d 654 (No. 06-3105) (discussing facts surrounding Justice De-
partment investigation); see also TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE
SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, at CRS-5, available at http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33668.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2008) (same). The
investigation received national attention when ajustice Department search of Con-
gressman Jefferson's Washington, D.C. residence uncovered $90,000 in cash pay-
ments from iGate in the freezer. See, e.g., Allan Lengel, FBI Says Jefferson Was Filmed
Taking Cash, WASH. POST, May 22, 2006, at Al (discussing uproar over discovery of
money in Congressman Jefferson's freezer); see also Corrected Brief of Appellee,
supra, at 5 (recalling discovery of cash in legislator's freezer). In the course of the
investigation, an aide of Congressman Jefferson, who pleaded guilty to bribery
charges implicating the legislator, indicated that pertinent documents remained in
the legislator's office. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 656 (discussing facts that led to
search of Congressman Jefferson's office).
[Vol. 53: p. 561
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss3/4
2008] NOTE 581
and returning any documents deemed privileged under the Speech or De-
bate Clause. 1
10
Shortly after the warrant was executed, Congressman Jefferson chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the search of his office under the Speech or
Debate Clause."I Pursuant to Rule 4 1 (g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure,1 12 Congressman Jefferson moved for the return of all docu-
ments seized during the search.1 13 The district court denied Congress-
man Jefferson's motions and noted that the warrant sought only materials
110. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 656-57 (discussing "special procedures" outlined
in warrant application designed to avoid violation of Speech or Debate Clause).
The warrant provided that FBI agents were to examine and confiscate all paper
documents relevant to the scope of the inquiry. See id. (same). Further, the war-
rant required the agents to copy electronic data stored in Congressman Jefferson's
office and deliver the data to a Justice Department filter team comprised of two
department attorneys and one FBI agent. See id. (same). The filter team was to
review paper documents and screen electronic documents using an FBI computer
analysis program. See id. (explaining method of review used by filter team). Fi-
nally, the warrant required that any documents deemed either privileged under
the Speech or Debate Clause or irrelevant to the scope of the Justice Department
inquiry be returned to Congressman Jefferson without prosecutorial review. See id.
(same).
Agents reviewing the documents were forbidden from being connected to the
criminal investigation of Congressman Jefferson. See id. at 656 (explaining warrant
procedures with respect to agents reviewing privileged material). Further, the
agents were barred from discussing any privileged legislative documents encoun-
tered during the search. See id. (same). The warrant application actively recog-
nized that the aim of the special processes was to avoid executive exposure to
privileged legislative material. See id. (explaining purpose of special procedures).
111. See id. at 657 (discussing Congressman Jefferson's challenge of search).
Congressman Jefferson challenged the search on May 24, 2006. See id. (noting
immediacy of Congressman Jefferson's challenge).
112. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 1(g). Rule 4 1 (g), which governs the remedy for im-
properly seized property, provides:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by
the deprivation of property may move for the property's return. The mo-
tion must be filed in the district where the property was seized. The court
must receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the mo-
tion. If it grants the motion, the court must return the property to the
movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to the
property and its use in later proceedings.
Id.
113. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 657 (discussing Congressman Jefferson's chal-
lenge to search). Congressman Jefferson also moved to enjoin the Justice Depart-
ment and FBI investigators from further reviewing the documents seized in the
search. See id. (same). Congressman Jefferson alleged that the search violated the
Speech or Debate Clause because it necessarily exposed privileged legislative docu-
ments to the Executive without the legislator's consent. See id. (explaining Con-
gressman Jefferson's basis for challenge of search and motion for return of
documents). In light of the legislator's appeal, the President directed the Justice
Department to seal and cease review of the documents for six weeks. See id. (dis-
cussing President's decision to refrain from examining documents removed from
Congressman Jefferson's office until district court ruled on motion for return of
documents).
21
Friel: Members Only - United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, Ro
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
"outside of the legitimate legislative sphere."' 14 Immediately thereafter,
Congressman Jefferson filed a notice of appeal and moved for a stay of
review pending appeal.1 15 After considering Congressman Jefferson's
emergency motion for a stay pending appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court re-
manded the question to the district court with instructions to determine
which seized documents were privileged under the Clause. 16 The district
court was to review all seized documents in camera, and return any privi-
leged documents to Congressman Jefferson.'
17
On June 4, 2007, a grand jury indicted Congressman Jefferson for
charges related to the ongoing Justice Department investigation. 1 8 In
light of the indictment, the D.C. Circuit Court agreed to consider Con-
gressman Jefferson's appeal under the collateral order doctrine. 91 On
114. See id. (discussing district court treatment of Congressman Jefferson's
challenge of search). As a result of the district court's holding, the Justice Depart-
ment resumed review of the seized documents. See id. at 657-58 (discussing Justice
Department's ability to regain possession of documents in light of district court's
ruling).
115. See id. at 657 (recounting Congressman Jefferson's response to district
court's ruling). Congressman Jefferson filed notice and motion on July 11, 2006,
one day after the district court announced its decision. See id. (same). In re-
sponse, the Attorney General again ordered a freeze of the Justice Department's
review of the confiscated materials. See id. at 657-58 (citing Corrected Brief for
Appellee, supra note 109, at 13) (noting Attorney General's order to cease review
of documents). The Attorney General's order compelled the FBI to regain posses-
sion of the documents. See id. (noting effect of Attorney General's order). The
freeze on review was to remain in place pending judicial review of Congressman
Jefferson's request for stay. See id. at 658 (same).
116. See id. (discussing remand order).
117. See id. (discussing procedures set forth in remand order). In considering
the legislator's appeal, the circuit court enjoined the Justice Department from re-
suming examination of the documents obtained in the search of the legislator's
office. See id. (noting circuit court's bar on executive review of materials seized in
search of Congressman Jefferson's office). The D.C. Circuit's remand order pro-
vided that the district court was to: (1) copy all seized documents and provide
Congressman Jefferson with copies; (2) employ the electronic filter to search
seized electronic documents for items relevant to the search warrant; (3) enable
Congressman Jefferson to submit claims of privilege with respect to any docu-
ments; and (4) review those documents in camera to determine whether the docu-
ments were in fact privileged under the Speech or Debate Clause. See id.
(describing remand processes previously ordered by circuit court). The circuit
court permitted the United States to examine documents that Congressman Jeffer-
son admitted to be non-privileged. See id. (discussing Congressman Jefferson's
concession and district court's directive to permit executive review of non-privi-
leged documents).
118. See id. (discussing grand jury indictment). The sixteen-count indictment
charged the legislator with racketeering, money laundering, wire fraud, obstruc-
tion ofjustice and bribery. See id. (detailing charges in indictment).
119. See id. at 658-59 (explaining circuit court's jurisdiction for hearing emer-
gency appeal). Noting that trial was scheduled forJanuary 2008, the D.C. Circuit
concluded that review of Congressman Jefferson's appeal was necessary under the
collateral order doctrine. See id. (explaining need for immediate review). If the
case went to trial without judicial determination as to the potentially privileged
nature of the seized evidence, Congressman Jefferson could be convicted on nec-
582 [Vol. 53: p. 561
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August 5, 2007, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the search and seizure of
Congressman Jefferson's paper files violated the Speech or Debate Clause,
and ordered the return of all privileged legislative materials.
120
IV. DISTINGUISHING THE ISSUE AND EXPANDING THE DOCTRINE: A
NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Rayburn, the D.C. Circuit considered whether an executive search
of a congressional office violated the testimonial privilege of the Speech or
Debate Clause. 1 2 1 The court noted that the search of Congressman Jeffer-
son's office was the first such search in American history.122 Nevertheless,
the Rayburn court moved beyond the identities of the parties and ex-
amined the search purely for the compelled disclosure of privileged legis-
lative documents.' 23
The D.C. Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court had not ad-
dressed a nondisclosure privilege. 12 4 Instead, the Rayburn court turned to
D.C. Circuit precedent in Brown & Williamson, which "ma[de] clear that a
key purpose of the privilege is to prevent intrusions in the legislative pro-
cess and that the legislative process is disrupted by the disclosure of legisla-
tive material, regardless of the use to which the disclosed materials are
put. 1 25 The court distinguished the facts of the search before it from
those in Brown & Williamson, which involved a civil suit request for privi-
essarily privileged evidence. See id. (same). On appeal, Congressman Jefferson
recognized that the remand procedures afforded by the circuit court were more
respectful of the Speech or Debate Clause privilege than the procedures initially
undertaken by the Justice Department. See Reply Brief of Congressman William J.
Jefferson at 15, Rayburn, 497 F.3d 654 (No. 06-3105) (conceding Congressman Jef-
ferson's preference for circuit court's procedures outlined in remand order). Nev-
ertheless, Congressman Jefferson contended that "procedures ... imposed [by the
court after the fact] cannot retroactively validate an illegal action." See id. at 13
(rationalizing basis for appeal of search procedures).
120. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 663 (relating D.C. Circuit Court's holding).
121. See id. at 659-63 (considering constitutionality of Justice Department's
search of Congressman Jefferson's congressional office pursuant to search
warrant).
122. See id. at 659 (noting that search of Congressman Jefferson's office was
first time Executive had conducted search of office of sitting member of
Congress).
123. See id. at 662 (analyzing search in context of compelled disclosure of
privileged materials rather than separation of powers).
124. See id. at 659 ("The Supreme Court has not spoken to the precise issue at
hand."). The Rayburn court relied on the Supreme Court's conclusion that the
Clause served "to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of
speech, debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Execu-
tive Branch." See id. at 659 (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616
(1972)) (discussing purpose of privilege afforded by Speech or Debate Clause).
125. See id. at 660 (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62
F.3d 408, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1995)) (recognizing D.C. Circuit precedent creating testi-
monial privilege of nondisclosure of privileged documents).
2008] NOTE 583
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leged materials. 12 6 Nevertheless, the Rayburn court cited Brown & William-
son's frequent discussion of the Clause in a criminal context as justification
for applying it to the facts in Rayburn.
127
Applying the Brown & Williamson framework, the Rayburn court
quickly concluded that the Justice Department search "must have" ex-
posed the Executive to legislative documents. 128 The court recognized
that because the privileges of the Clause are absolute, even the special
procedures outlined in the warrant application did not absolve the viola-
tion because the procedures did not prevent preemptive executive re-
view. 129 Thus, the incidental review of confiscated paper materials
violated the Clause, but procedures outlined for the review of confiscated
electronic material did not.
30
126. See id. (differentiating between civil suit in Brown & Williamson and crimi-
nal suit before it in Rayburn). For further discussion of the facts and holding of
Brown & Williamson, see supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
127. See Rayburn, 493 F.3d at 660 (justifying reliance on Brown & Williamson in
criminal context). In further support of reliance on Brown & Williamson, the Ray-
burn court referred to the Brown & Williamson analysis as "profound." See id.
(same).
128. See id. at 661 (concluding that search exposed agents to legislative mater-
ials). The Rayburn court opined that the warrant itself "contemplated" exposure of
privileged materials because it proscribed wholesale review of the legislator's docu-
ments and return of those deemed privileged. See id. (same). Employing judicial
notice, the court surmised that some seized materials could be politically embar-
rassing. See id. (concluding that seized documents could contain evidence of
"frank or embarrassing statements"). The court concluded that compelled review
of such politically sensitive documents could "chill the exchange of views" within
the legislator's office, an effect distinctly guarded against by the Speech or Debate
Clause. See id. (recognizing chilling effect of compelled disclosure upon legislative
process and noting that such "chill runs counter to the Clause's purpose of pro-
tecting against disruption of the legislative process").
Having reached its analytical determination, the D.C. Circuit then dismantled
the arguments of the district court and the Government on appeal. See id. (ad-
dressing argument of United States and analysis of district court). Notably, the
circuit court rejected the contention that the scope of the testimonial privilege was
narrowed in the context of a criminal search warrant. See id. (considering effect of
valid search warrant upon Speech or Debate Clause privileges). The Rayburn court
emphasized that the issue was not the validity of the Justice Department search
warrant under the Fourth Amendment, but whether the search had preemptively
exposed the Executive to legislative materials without the consent of the legislator.
See id. (distinguishing between analysis of constitutionality of search itself and con-
stitutionality of manner in which documents were reviewed).
129. See id. at 662 ("The special procedures outlined in the warrant affidavit
would not have avoided the violation of the Speech or Debate Clause because they
denied the Congressman any opportunity to identify and assert the privilege with
respect to legislative materials before their compelled disclosure to Executive
agents.").
130. See id. at 663 (setting forth holding with respect to Speech or Debate
Clause application). Because the electronic documents were to be reviewed with a
search engine, the court concluded that the Executive had not actually reviewed
privileged documents and was thus not in violation of the Speech or Debate
Clause. See id. (same). For a discussion of the processes followed by agents execut-
ing the warrant, see supra note 110.
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Significantly, the D.C. Circuit recognized that though absolute, Con-
gressman Jefferson's legislative privilege could potentially be asserted in a
way that concomitantly recognized the Executive's interest in law enforce-
ment.1 3 1 On the facts, the circuit court concluded that the in camera re-
view provided in its earlier remand order would sufficiently recognize
both privileges. 132 Nevertheless, the court stopped short of advocating for
specific balancing mechanisms in future searches.' 33
Finally, the Rayburn court considered the appropriate relief for the
recognized violation of the representative's legislative privilege of testimo-
nial nondisclosure. 134 Specifically, the Rayburn court examined whether a
violation of Congressman Jefferson's legislative immunity warranted the
return of all seized documents.' 35 Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit compelled
the return of only privileged paper documents, but not non-privileged
documents, as Congressman Jefferson had requested. 13 6
131. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 662 (identifying potential for satisfaction of com-
peting legislative and executive interests). The court correctly observed that Con-
gressman Jefferson's position on appeal was only that legislative privilege
preempted the execution of the Justice Department's search warrant. See id. (dis-
cussing Congressman Jefferson's argument on appeal). Thus, the court distin-
guished between the absolute application of the Speech or Debate privilege, and
the satisfaction of that privilege by allowing it to preempt subsequent review. See
id. (same).
132. See id. 662-63 (expressing satisfaction that processes of remand order
could satisfy interest of both legislator and Executive). For a detailed explanation
of the document review process outlined in the remand order, see supra notes 116-
17 and accompanying text.
133. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 663 (concluding that determination of how to
accommodate both interests is "best determined by the legislative and executive
branches").
134. See id. at 663-66 (analyzing appropriate relief for recognized violation of
Clause).
135. See id. at 664 (recognizing that Congressman Jefferson sought return of
all seized documents, both privileged and non-privileged).
136. See id. at 666 (setting forth relief for violation of Speech or Debate
Clause). In determining the appropriate relief for the violation of Congressman
Jefferson's Speech or Debate Clause privilege, the Rayburn court gave special defer-
ence to the unique nature of the legislative privilege. See id. at 663-64 (citing Fields
v. Office of Eddie Bernice Johnson, 459 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that
Clause preserves legislative function and buttresses separation of federal powers).
The court noted that the Clause forbade compelled disclosure of privileged legisla-
tive materials only. See id. at 664 (distinguishing protections of Clause). The court
noted that Congressman Jefferson had been unable to demonstrate that his legisla-
tive office would be disrupted if denied the original copies of non-privileged docu-
ments. See id. at 665 (parsing Congressman Jefferson's appeal). Moreover, the
D.C. Circuit recognized the Executive's interest in law enforcement, and con-
cluded that Congressman Jefferson's non-privileged materials might be relevant to
the criminal prosecution against him. See id. (distinguishing effect of return of
non-privileged documents). Thus, the Rayburn court ordered the return of only
paper documents deemed privileged upon remand. See id. at 666 (setting forth
appropriate relief for violation of Speech or Debate Clause).
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V. BLAZING A NEW PATH, BUT MUDDYING THE TRAIL: A
CRITICAL ANALYsIs
In Rayburn, the D.C. Circuit Court was called upon to exercise its
unique judiciary function as guardian of the separation of powers under
the Speech or Debate Clause.' 3 7 Indeed, the Rayburn court bore addi-
tional judicial responsibility in that no federal appellate court had ever
ruled upon the constitutionality of an executive search of the office of a
sitting member of Congress. 13 8 Moreover, no court had ever considered
the application of the testimonial immunity of the Speech or Debate
Clause in the incidental review of privileged documents pursuant to a valid
search warrant. 139 The Rayburn opinion represents not only an astute in-
terpretation of Supreme Court and circuit precedent, but also a conscien-
tious effort to serve the Constitution through rigorous application of its
principles. 140 Nevertheless, the opinion avoided several issues that could
ultimately prove problematic for future courts.
1 4
'
A. Astute Application of the Speech or Debate Clause
The D.C. Circuit in Rayburn deftly walked a constitutional tightrope,
recognizing the issue before it not as one of the constitutionality of a
search pursuant to a warrant, but of the application of recognized Speech
or Debate Clause principles to the Justice Department's review of legisla-
tive documents found in a legislator's office. 14 2 The court's acute disposal
of the notion that a warrant qualified the scope of the Clause was both
137. Cf id. at 659-63 (evaluating Speech or Debate Clause as applied to pre-
emptive search of Congressman Jefferson's office).
138. See id. at 659 (recognizing that search of Congressman Jefferson's office
was first search of its type in American history).
139. Compare id. at 659-63 (considering application of Speech or Debate
Clause to execution of valid warrant to search office of sitting legislator), with
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(applying testimonial Speech or Debate Clause immunity to subpoena duces te-
cum of legislators regarding whereabouts of reports in possession of committee),
MINPECO, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 861-62 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (applying testimonial privilege concerning subpoena duces tecum of docu-
ments in possession of congressional subcommittee), Miller v. Transamerican
Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying testimonial privilege in
motion to compel deposition testimony of non-party former representative), and
In re Grand Jury Investigation into Possible Violations of Title 18, 587 F.2d 589,
594-98 (3d Cir. 1978) (applying testimonial privilege to subpoena of congressional
phone records).
140. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 659-60 (expanding upon precedent to recognize
applicability of Speech or Debate Clause to incidental review of privileged legisla-
tive material in context of criminal search warrant). For further discussion of the
groundbreaking extension of the Clause set forth by the Rayburn court, see infra
notes 143-56 and accompanying text.
141. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 662-63 (extending application of testimonial
Speech or Debate Clause privilege but failing to discuss appropriate steps for satis-
faction of competing legislator and executive interests in great detail).
142. See id. at 661-62 (distinguishing constitutional issues on appeal).
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insightful and momentous. 1 4  Having moved beyond the historic facts of
the suit, the court freed itself to examine the search purely within the issue
of executive review of Congressman Jefferson's privileged documents in
several important ways. 1
44
First, the Rayburn decision is notable for its application of Brown &
Williamson's broad nondisclosure framework of the Speech or Debate
Clause to search warrants issued in criminal cases. 145 The Rayburn court
employed a chain of logic that recognized the role of the Clause as an
absolute protection against inquiry into privileged legislative conduct or
documents. 14 6 In the eyes of the court, such absolute breadth could not
be qualified by the constitutional assurances included in a valid search
warrant. 14 7 Rather, the court properly concluded that criminal investiga-
tions into the conduct of legislators will be subject to the same level of
judicial scrutiny and concern for the legislative process as private civil suits
that either name legislators as parties to the suit or seek discovery of legis-
lative documents.'
48
Second, the D.C. Circuit perceptively applied the principle of nondis-
closure despite the fact that the search actively sought only non-privileged
material. 149 Rayburn's extension of the doctrinal assessment of Brown &
Williamson and its ilk represents the first case to address criminal discovery
proceedings that do not target information that is privileged under the
Speech or Debate Clause. 1 50 The circuit court recognized that the abso-
143. Cf id. at 661 (recognizing that constitutionality of search of representa-
tive's office pursuant to properly obtained and executed warrant was not at issue
on appeal).
144. Cf id. at 660 (examining search in framework of Speech or Debate
Clause violation). The Rayburn court's analysis focused purely upon the extent to
which an outside party forcibly reviewed privileged legislative material. See id. at
660-61 (analyzing search in context of Speech or Debate Clause as guard against
legislative interruption). Because compelled review by any non-legislator violates
the testimonial privilege of the Clause, the court avoided the separation of powers
issue. Cf id. (considering search only in terms of compelled disclosure rather than
executive overreaching).
145. See id. at 660 (analyzing Clause as protection against compelled disclo-
sure of privileged documents in criminal context).
146. See id. at 662 (reasoning that because Clause is absolute and does not
distinguish between oral or written testimony, Brown & Williamson framework must
apply regardless of purpose behind compelled disclosure).
147. See id. (refusing to balance Speech or Debate Clause against competing
interests of Executive in light of absolute nature of Clause).
148. See id. at 660 (discussing application of Clause to criminal proceedings).
The Rayburn court noted that a view of the Clause as narrowing in criminal pro-
ceedings was inconsistent with circuit and Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 661
(citing United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972)) (adhering to broad
reading of Clause in criminal proceeding).
149. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 661 (applying Speech or Debate Clause protec-
tion despite recognizing that search warrant did not seek privileged legislative
material).
150. Compare id. (applying Speech or Debate Clause protection where warrant
sought non-privileged material), with Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wil-
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lute nature of the privilege necessarily barred any review of privileged ma-
terial, regardless of the stated scope of the inquiry. 151 Thus, the Rayburn
court's application of legislative immunity in the search of Congressman
Jefferson's office represents a conscientious and astute application of the
Supreme Court's stated preference for broad interpretation of the
Clause. 1
5 2
Finally, the Rayburn decision is notable for its attempt to satisfy the
competing interests of legislators and the Executive. 153 The circuit court
distinguished between the balancing of an absolute privilege and the po-
tential for satisfaction of both the legislative privilege and the Executive's
interest in law enforcement.' 54 Thus, the court's analysis concluded that
the true violation of the Clause occurred only because the Executive re-
viewed privileged material prior to the legislator's opportunity to assert
the privilege. 155 In so doing, the court effectively recognized that the tes-
timonial privilege is one of absolute, preemptive nondisclosure, regardless
of the nature or scope of the inquiry. 1 56
B. Potentially Hazardous Shortcomings
The D.C. Circuit's deft analysis accurately construed the dilemma
before it as a violation of the Speech or Debate Clause through review of
privileged documents rather than one of the constitutionality of a warrant
to search a congressional office. 15 7 Regrettably, the court provided only
negligible guidance for future courts with respect to the solution chosen
liams, 62 F.3d 408, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying Speech or Debate Clause protec-
tion from subpoena privileged legislative documents), MINPECO, S.A. v.
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same), Miller v.
Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 528-29 (5th Cir. 1983) (same), In re
Grand Jury Investigation into Possible Violations of Title 18, 587 F.2d 589, 594-98
(3d Cir. 1978) (considering testimonial immunity for privileged materials), and In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 580-82 (3d Cir. 1977) (same). For a
discussion of the current boundaries of privileged legislative activity, see supra
notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
151. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660 (applying Speech or Debate Clause regard-
less of purposes for which information was reviewed in violation of privilege).
152. Cf id. (expanding judicial recognition of Clause to include all purposes
for which privileged material is reviewed).
153. See id. at 662 ("There would appear to be no reason why the Congress-
man's privilege under the Speech or Debate Clause cannot be asserted at the out-
set of a search in a manner that also protects the interests of the Executive in law
enforcement.").
154. See id. at 662-63 (refusing to balance competing executive and legislative
interests but recognizing potential for satisfaction of both in manner that does not
violate legislators' Speech or Debate Clause privileges).
155. See id. at 663 ("[W]e hold that a search that allows agents of the Execu-
tive to review privileged materials without the Member's consent violates the
Clause.").
156. See, e.g., id. at 662 (discussing nature of Speech or Debate Clause
violation).
157. See id. (characterizing Congressman Jefferson's argument on appeal and
proceeding with analysis of potential Speech or Debate Clause violation).
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for the violation. a58 Accordingly, the Rayburn opinion could serve as the
basis for future challenges not to the application of the Clause, but to the
procedures implemented to protect it.159
First, the court stopped short of advocating for specific procedures
that satisfy the Clause while also protecting the interest of the Executive in
law enforcement. 160 Instead, the court concluded that the Legislature
and the Executive themselves would best determine that question.
1 6 1
Thus, the court passed on the opportunity to explicitly sanction a proce-
dure that could be both effective and constitutionally appropriate.
162
Moreover, the court perfunctorily approved the processes set forth in
its previous remand order, but did not analyze the remand procedures in
the context of a recognized Speech or Debate Clause violation. 163 First,
the court failed to discuss any applicable limit to the legislator's ability to
assert the privilege.' 64 Indeed, the court did not recognize what, if any-
thing, could prevent a legislator from asserting the privilege with respect
to the entire office.
165
Additionally, the court did not specify the extent to which a legislator
could challenge the judicial in camera designation of documents as un-
privileged.1 66 Further, the court's process upon remand seems unlikely to
dissuade future legislators from quickly attaching a legislative element to
158. Cf id. (briefly addressing satisfaction of both executive and legislative
interests in process for review of documents pursuant to valid search warrant).
159. See id. (failing to provide detailed analysis of procedure for conducting
future searches of congressional offices).
160. See id. at 662-63 (recognizing Speech or Debate Clause violation but
avoiding recommendation for future courts seeking to correct similar violation).
The circuit court recognized that an opportunity to invoke legislative privilege
must precede any review. See id. (discussing nature of legislative privilege of non-
disclosure). Nevertheless, the court recognized only that a legislator's interests
might be accommodated by sealing the office to the Justice Department after it
had been marked for search until the legislator could assert the privilege. See id.
(hypothesizing potential for various ways to protect legislative privilege in execu-
tive search of congressional offices).
161. See id. at 663 (deferring determination of how to satisfy competing inter-
ests in execution of Clause to Legislature and Executive).
162. See id. (refusing to offerjudicial estimation of most effective way for both
executive and legislative interests to be satisfied in execution of search warrant in
congressional office).
163. See id. at 662-63 (concluding that remand order would satisfy all con-
cerns regarding protracted judicial burden in executing in camera review but fail-
ing to advise on how best to complete that process). The remand order had been
issued prior to the circuit court opinion in Rayburn demonstrating that the search
violated Congressman Jefferson's rights under the Speech or Debate Clause. See
id. at 657-58 (noting historical timeline of Congressman Jefferson's appeal).
164. See id. at 662-63 (discussing burdens of procedure for in camera review in
remand order).
165. Cf id. at 663 (neglecting to elaborate on process for assertion of legisla-
tive privilege for in camera review).
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documents that may soon become the subject of an executive inquiry. 167
Finally, the Rayburn opinion forbore an attempt to differentiate a painstak-
ing in camera review from an interruption of the legislative process.1 68
The court justified its ambivalence with respect to future execution of
similar procedures by citing the historical infrequency of executive review
similar to that in the case before it.1 69 The court's superficial approval of
its own remand order provides little guidance for future courts seeking to
apply the Rayburn court's analysis.' 7 0 Thus, the court's cursory recogni-
tion of effective solutions to the unprecedented search in Rayburn may
present a complicated qualification to the groundbreaking analysis
achieved by the court.17 1
VI. IMPACT
The D.C. Circuit in Rayburn trod considerable amounts of heretofore-
unmapped constitutional territory. 172 Indeed, the singularity of the Ray-
burn decision indicates that future courts will likely reference the case
when considering similar searches. 173 Moreover, the fact that the Houses
of Congress are situated within the District of Columbia foreshadows Ray-
burn's relevance, inasmuch as future challenges to similar searches of con-
gressional premises will likely take place within the D.C. Circuit's
167. Cf id. (compelling return to Congressman Jefferson of all privileged
documents reviewed by Executive without legislator's consent).
168. See id. at 660 (recognizing that key function of Clause is to prevent intru-
sion into legislative process). But see id. at 662-63 (authorizing potentially long-
term in camera review of documents in legislator's office). For discussion of the
Rayburn court's justification for this potentially protracted review and the burdens
it may place on the court, see infra note 169 and accompanying text.
169. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 662-63 (addressing governmental concerns for
burden placed on district court and delay produced by exhaustive review of seized
material). The circuit court recognized the potentially large burden of review that
the Rayburn opinion foisted upon the district court and rationalized its decision by
concluding that "such a burden will be, at most, infrequent." See id. at 663 (justify-
ing burden of review placed on district court).
170. See id. at 662-63 (offering minimal guidance for future remand proceed-
ings or how Judiciary can best avoid constitutional Speech or Debate issue in
search of congressional offices).
171. See id. at 659-63 (analyzing Speech or Debate Clause but providing mini-
mal analysis for procedures to solve recognized violation of Clause on remand).
172. Cf id. at 661 (applying testimonial privilege of nondisclosure to execu-
tion of valid search warrant in criminal investigation).
173. Cf Pardo, supra note 13, at 868-69 (discussing potential for Speech or
Debate Clause challenge to executive search of congressional office). One group
of commentators recognized the issue as "unresolved," but pointed to the appear-
ance of Rayburn before the D.C. Circuit as an indication that the issue would soon
be considered. See id. at 869 (discussing pending appeal in Rayburn); TATELMAN,
supra note 109, at CRS-12 (recognizing issue in Rayburn as unresolved and forecast-
ing clarity pending Congressman Jefferson's then-upcoming appeal to D.C.
Circuit).
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jurisdiction and thus be bound to Rayburn's analysis. 174 Given that the
public sturm und drang associated with allegations of congressional corrup-
tion often prompts executive investigation, Rayburn's treatment of eviden-
tiary privilege deserves special attention from all who occupy positions
within the three branches of federal government. 17
5
Additionally, Rayburn's high profile may draw scrutiny to the long-
standing circuit dispute regarding application of Speech or Debate Clause
immunity to non-testimonial compelled disclosure. 176 Indeed, applica-
tion of the Third Circuit's nonevidentiary use doctrine to the facts of Ray-
burn may have produced an opposite conclusion than that of the D.C.
Circuit. 177 Thus, the Justice Department may seek Supreme Court review
174. Cf Brief of Congressman William J. Jefferson at 1, Rayburn, 497 F.3d 654
(No. 06-3105) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3231) (setting forth District of Columbia as ap-
propriate jurisdiction for district court and appellate action in Rayburn); see also
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rayburn, 497 F.3d 654 (No. 07-816) (appealing D.C.
Circuit's decision in Rayburn). On writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, the United States asserted:
Investigations designed to ferret out congressional corruption . . . find
their nerve center in the Nation's capital [sic]. Because of that fact, deci-
sions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit have a uniquely important role in defining the Constitution's ex-
press protection for legislators: the Speech or Debate Clause.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra, at 11 (recognizing need for clarity in D.C.
Circuit's application of Speech or Debate Clause).
175. Cf Gary Langer, Poll: Americans Support Searches, ABC NEws, June 1, 2006,
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/PolVault/story?id=2025343&page=I (reporting
that eighty-six percent of Americans approved of FBI searches of Congressman
Jefferson's office). In addition to Congressman Jefferson, several other recent
members of Congress have been subject to investigation and public harangue re-
garding allegations of corruption. See Phillip Shennon, Federal Lawmakers From
Coast to Coast Are Under Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2007, at A16 (catalogu-
ing recent indictment and investigation of several members of Congress); see also
Laylan Copelin & W. Gardner Selby, DeLay to Quit Race, Will Resign Seat, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Apr. 4, 2006, at Al (detailing resignation of House Speaker
Tom DeLay, who was plagued by allegations of corruption); Chuck Neubauer &
Richard T. Cooper, Senator's Way to Wealth Was Paved With Favors, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
17, 2003, at Al (documenting allegations of corruption against Senator Ted Ste-
vens); Jeremy Wallace, Representative Mark Foley Quits in Disgrace, SARASOTA HERALD-
TRIB., Sept. 30, 2006, at Al (recalling resignation and public outcry surrounding
disgraced Congressman Mark Foley).
176. Cf Carl Hulse, FB.L Raid Divides G.O.P. Lawmakers and White House, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2006, at Al (noting widespread attention given to search of Con-
gressman Jefferson's office); Allan Lengel, Representative Jefferson Wins Ruling
Against FBI, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2007, at Al (reporting on outcome of Congress-
man Jefferson's appeal to D.C. Circuit).
177. Cf In re Grand Jury Investigation into Possible Violations of Title 18, 587
F.2d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[T]he privilege when applied to records ... is one
of nonevidentiary use, not of non-disclosure."). Presumably, application of Third
Circuit construction of the testimonial Speech or Debate privilege would permit
the Justice Department to participate in the in camera review of the seized docu-
ments on remand, or would not have found a violation of the Clause in the inci-
dental review of the documents in the first place. Cf id. (authorizing United States
Attorney to participate in in camera review of potentially privileged congressional
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of the issue, in order to secure the right to conduct incidental review of
privileged materials in future criminal investigations of members of Con-
gress.178 Given the intensity of bi-partisan congressional protest to the
search, it is likely that application of the Third Circuit's nonevidentiary
use doctrine would have produced a general panic among members of
Congress.'
79
Despite the district court's concern, the Rayburn decision itself is un-
likely to transform congressional offices into "taxpayer-subsidized sanc-
tuar[ies] for crime." 180 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit rejected Congressman
Jefferson's request to return all seized materials.' 8' Nevertheless, the gen-
phone records). For a discussion of the facts and holding in GrandJury, see supra
notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
178. See Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, Supreme Court of the
United States Blog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/partial-viola-
tion-of-congressmans-rights-found/ (Aug. 3, 2007, 13:20 EST) (analyzing D.C. Cir-
cuit opinion in Rayburn and opining that case is "destined for" Supreme Court
review). In December, 2007, the United States filed a writ of certiorari with the
Supreme Court, appealing the D.C. Circuit court's decision in Rayburn. See Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 174.
179. Cf Reckless Justice: Did the Saturday Night Raid of Congress Trample the Consti-
tution?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement
of Rep. Bruce Fein), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/OversightTestimony.
aspx?ID=637 (chastising Executive branch for conducting search of Congressman
Jefferson's legislative office). Members of Congress from both parties reacted
harshly to what they perceived as overreaching by the Executive branch. See Hulse,
supra note 176 (noting bi-partisan congressional outcry over search of Congress-
man Jefferson's office); Shailagh Murray & Allan Lengel, Lawmakers Demand FBI
Return Raid Files, B. GLOBE, May 25, 2006, at A2 (same). House Judiciary Commit-
tee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., forecasted hearings into the "pro-
foundly disturbing" actions of the Justice Department. See Murray & Lengel, supra
(noting congressional promise of Committee hearings regarding search).
180. In reSearch of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room Number 2113, 432
F. Supp. 2d. 100, 119 (D.D.C. 2006) (upholding search of Congressman Jefferson's
office), rev'd, 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3349
(U.S. Dec. 19, 2007) (No. 07-816). The D.C. Circuit recognized that the Speech or
Debate Clause precluded executive review of only privileged documents, and not
all documents in congressional offices. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 665 (compelling
return of non-privileged documents). Thus, the circuit court's reasoning pre-
served both the role of the Clause and the executive interest in law enforcement.
Cf id. (same).
181. See Reply Brief of Congressman William J. Jefferson, supra note 119, at
23-26 (arguing that Speech or Debate Clause violation requires return of all seized
property). Ultimately, Congressman Jefferson and the Justice Department each
claimed the circuit court ruling as a victory for their side. Compare Press Release,
Robert Trout, Congressman Jefferson Wins Ruling On Speech or Debate Clause
(Aug. 13, 2007), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/
TroutStatement8.03.07.doc (last visited Feb. 14, 2008) ("We are pleased with the
DC Circuit's ruling that the unprecedented search conducted by the FBI violated
Congressman Jefferson's ights under the Speech or Debate [C]lause ...."), with
Press Release, Brian Roehrkasse, Acting Dir. of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep't ofJustice,
Appeals Court Ruling in the Jefferson Case (Aug. 3, 2007), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/August/07_opa_579.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2008)
("The Department of Justice [is] ... pleased that the D.C. Circuit opinion allows
the prosecutors to retain non-Speech or Debate [C]lause documents."). Indeed,
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eral lack of clarity regarding the application of the Clause, exemplified by
contrasting Rayburn and a hypothetical examination of the facts of Rayburn
under Third Circuit precedent, demonstrates the need for wholesale Su-
preme Court review of the nature of the testimonial privilege under the
Speech or Debate Clause. 182 Until then, the Capitol building is affixed
with a proverbial sign reading "Keep Out! Members Only!"
1 83
John D. Friel
the return of non-privileged documents is unlikely to impact Congressman Jeffer-
son's criminal case in that the indictment was based on materials not recovered by
the search of Congressman Jefferson's office. Cf Press Release, Brian Roehrkasse,
supra ("The Department of Justice will continue to prepare for trial, scheduled for
January 2008 ....").
182. Compare Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 663 (prohibiting incidental executive re-
view of privileged legislative documents), with In re Grand Jury Investigation into
Possible Violations of Title 18, 587 F.2d at 597 (allowing executive review of privi-
leged legislative documents so long as documents are not used for evidentiary
purpose).
183. Cf Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 663 (prohibiting preemptive and incidental ex-
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